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In October 1994, it has been a year from the beginning of 
implementation of the Stabilisation program in Croatia. As at the time its 
passing and, particularly, its basic principles have been the subject of a 
series of discussions burdened with partial problems, so are now the 
process and modalities of its previous and future realisation undergoing 
different evaluations and attitudes, ranging from the glorification of the 
"economy miracle" to the partial criticisms of the scenarios and the 
method of the Program implementation. The fact is that this Program 
has represented the basis for the conclusion of the stand-by 
arrangement with International Monetary Fund, so in this context it is 
explained either as a very important step on the way to international 
affirmation of Croatia, or as a self-initiative "hasting into" more 
restrictive regulations of economic behaviour forced on by international 
financial system but not adequate at the economic instant of Croatia, 
nor are the regulations used internally by the countries-creditors. 
 
If the estimates, only declaratively referring to the Program, though in 
fact reflecting the attitude towards the immediate protagonists, are 
excluded, the difference of the evaluations on the Program and its 
implementation must be proving the existence of vast differences not 
only in the sphere of comprehending the "essence" of the Program and 
the possible implementation results, but also in the sphere of effective 
consequences its implementation might have on particular segments of 
Croatian economy and the society as a whole. 
 
The differences are, in a way, brought about by the Program itself, by 
its contents, the manner of presentation and mostly by the concrete 
results which do not appear easy to be stereotyped and put into the 
limits of a dogmatised knowledge and the expectance of the desired. 
Though, in fact, it has begun its existence as the element of a continuity  
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of economic policy, realised at the very moment the economic, political 
and other conditions had ripened, the Program could not have contained 
the characteristics of continuity and even its passing had been forced by 
the escalation of hyper-inflation which itself had arisen from the 
effective stands of the previous policy. Thus, it is marking the kind of 
crash of some of essential segments of the previous policy and 
populistic philosophy on which it had been, whether with awareness or 
not, founded. 
 
However, it does not mean that the situation in the country as well as 
its relationship with the international environment had not been 
changed with regard to the previous state, nor does it imply that within 
the previously organised economic policy some moves to facilitate and 
even directly to assure the implementation of the Program had not been 
made - including the changes of the relative prices and the preparations 
for the beginning of the implementation of the Program presented in the 
crucial passing of the Law on Foreign Exchange System - but it was the 
Program that had given rise to the essentially changed relation of the 
economic policy with the activities occurring in the country. The policy 
had been transformed from the instruments of discovering the ways to 
survive within the given economic conditions to the means to create 
conditions in which it might be possible to start on radical changes. The 
forced speed of preparations and passing of the Program as well as the 
related constellation of the relations within the society has had 
significant implication on the Program's character, goals and general 
conditions of its implementation. 
 
Basically, inspite the reference to the large concept of stabilisation, the 
Program does not seem to be exceeding the limits of a consistent set of 
anti-inflation measures, or is in fact containing the elaboration of only 
the first phase of the stabilisation policy, while the other phases are 
connected to the changing of the economic system and totality of the 
process of transition and are not defined in details. This is a logical 
conclusion as the stopping of inflation represents the condition for the 
beginning of the re-structuring of economy and introducing the 
development  components  into   the  economy  policy,   but   the   fact  
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remains that "parallel drive on two lanes" leaves enough space for the 
occurrence of disharmony and of the reduction of the global efficacity of 
economic policy. 
 
The problem was difficult to avoid owing to the necessity of an urgent 
anti-inflation intervention in the given economy and system conditions 
the changes of which might require a lengthy period of time as well as 
to the reason of the transition of the economic system, with the 
attempts to take over and modify the standard solutions of the practice 
in the world, being partly burdened with the same populistic spirit which 
was present in the economic policy preceding the Program. The fact 
mainly refers to the complex of transformation of ownership, its 
economic and social aspects, implying the double role of the state - on 
one side as the creator and the subject implementing the economy 
policy, while on the other as the major (at least temporarily) owner of 
state-owned part of economy on which the measures of the economy 
policy are to implemented. The dualism has been brought out in a series 
of forms of mutual intermingling of interests on the relation state-
enterprise, the point of contact being in the banking system, thus 
influencing its relationship with the central bank. Therefore, in practice, 
there have not been made attempts to realise some elements of the 
Program more fully, or these must have been introduced into the 
Program outside the context of the basic scenario. Fortunately, the 
elements have later proved to be non-essential from the point of view of 
the realisation of the basic goal posed by the Program. 
 
That way, the bearers of the economy policy have been given chance of 
being widely active by methods of indirect, and even direct influencing 
the activities of the economy subjects (through inducing the changes of 
the relations on the market, particularly the foreign exchange one; 
through the power of legal provisions and rights of the major owner), 
but still in the relatively limited intermingling of different interests and 
with the limitations of the direct goal. Therefore, the results of the 




On the basis of such approach, the success of the Program is 
undoubtful. The implementation had immediately shown that, no matter 
what the initial driving forces, the preceding progression of the inflation 
to the monthly level of 30% had not been the necessary result of the 
supposed surplus of the aggregate demand over the war depressed real 
level of the domestic production and supply, nor was it the product of 
the structural disbalance arising from the limited capabilities of the 
mechanisms of non-inflation distribution of incomes to harmonize the 
primary distribution with the rigid sector structure of effective demand, 
but that the phase of inflation progression represented the typical self-
reproductive hyper-inflation in which, by various mechanisms of 
indexation, upon which the growing inertia of inflatory expectation has 
been built. 
 
Hence, it has been demonstrated that the stopping of such a type of 
inflation could be done quickly by using the shock therapy, not the 
gradualism, directed to the destruction of the mechanisms of the 
reproduction of inflatory expectations, not by moves of drastic 
administrating, but the purposeful use of market disbalance deepened 
previously by the hyper-inflation itself. The key role has belonged to the 
opening of foreign exchange market and to the introduction of internal 
convertibility of national currency, which helped the previous inflation 
drastically reduced quantity of real money to be inducing a significant 
rise of supply through transferring of accumulated foreign exchange, 
thus stopping not only indexation but bringing about the appreciation of 
the exchange rate as the basic indicator of inflatory expectations. The 
effectively insufficient real level of domestic aggregate demand 
connected to it, particularly with regard to the supply with indexed 
expenses which has become obvious at the moment of the decrease of 
credit activity of the banks. 
 
Due to the disbalance at the beginning of the Program implementation, 
the inflation did not only stop, but economy entered the deflation 
process, to be arriving to the stabilisation of the prices on the level 
which has been 12% lower at the producer of industrial products level 
than the price  before the  Program implementation, which corresponds 
 5
to the intensity of performed appreciation of the exchange rate. It has 
reduced and then stabilised the expenses of input in the infra-structural 
branches with mainly high, direct or indirect, importation content, which 
resulted in above-average reduction of the prices (in production of oil 
and gas by 20%, of oil derivates by 27%, of chemical products by 17% 
and in the electrical industry by 30%) and on that basis in the relative 
reduction of total material expenditure of the domestic economy. At the 
same time, the appreciation of the exchange rate has directly influenced 
the prices of the output in the mainly export branches which cannot put 
the exchange rate difference on the importer, and due to the limited 
domestic market they cannot be building them into the domestic prices 
(14% decrease of prices in machine construction, 13% in production of 
electric devices and equipment, 20% in the finished textile products 
etc.), while the fact that part of the infra-structure branches (oil 
derivates, chemicals) are, at the same time, the significant exporters 
seems to be stressing the influence of the appreciation of the exchange 
rate upon the decrease of production prices. 
 
Simultaneously, the prices were receiving impact from the low liquidity 
and relatively high price of domestic money, implying also the high 
demand for money and limited demand for commodities and services on 
the domestic market. As the first one is resulting in keeping a relatively 
high level of interest rates, the other one, in combination with the 
appreciated exchange rate is strengthening the relatively high influence 
of the foreign competition, they have been directing the producers, in 
the entirety of the activity, to seek for the solution of the insolvency 
problem in the real sphere, or in the increase of the trade and 
realisation. 
 
That way, the relation between the supply and demand on the domestic 
market, has begun to be gradually influencing the price moves, and 
depending on it the quantity of products and services, making them 
psychologically weaker, while the market elements have been 
strengthening in structure of price forming. In the trading the situation 
appeared similar, so that the retail prices have been following the 
general tendency of the decrease of producer prices, though with the 
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slower intensity and, in October 1994 they have been by 2% lower than 
in the same month of the last year. 
 
The intensity of such moving of the price aggregate appears to be as 
important as the extension of the basis which points to the powerful 
presence of demonstration effect and it arises from the changes in the 
sphere of inflation expectations. For that reason the activity of the 
Program regarding the movement of the prices has been all-inclusive 
and unvarying, which only seems to confirm that the determinants of 
the past inflation have been general but not partial. 
 
Thence, the stopping of inflation and the realised reduction of the 
prices, have made the reform  of the tax system result in positive 
activity of solving the problem of one of the crucial initial factors of 
inflation - budget deficit. This only confirms the thesis of the multiple 
reverse activity of hyper-inflation on intensifying of problems in fiscal 
sphere and it varies from the impact the deficit may have in 
transforming the normal inflation into hyper-inflation, as well as the 
thesis that the problems by themselves do not always lead to hyper-
inflation. And the last was the case in Croatia, at least in the domain of 
fiscal changes which have arisen directly as the consequence of war. If 
it were not so, the hyperinflation would not have been stopped so 
quickly inspite the character of the anti-inflation program and the 
decisiveness in its application. 
 
Together with the realisation of such primary results of the 
implementation of the Program, the significance of the expenditure, i.e. 
the cost of its implementation, has increased,  and  on that very 
question the differences in evaluations of its success have arisen. That 
appears logical, as the experience of countries has been so varied, 
despite many theories of the possibilities of dis-inflation of the national 
economy without significant macro-economic expenditure in the area of 
the drop of the production, employment rates and standard in the 
programs in which the central position is held by the currency rate 
policy and non-worsening of the relation in the balance of payments. 
Therefrom, within the context of totality of conditions  in  Croatia,  there 
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are still present the beliefs that the stopping of inflation and the 
occurrence of de-flation with the appreciation of the exchange rate, 
which all bespoke of the restrictions in monetary policy, will have to 
have negative reflection on the production and exportation though with 
a time difference. 
 
However, the facts are proving that it has not occurred, at least not in 
the sense of the direct global impact. The basic reason for that lies in 
the fact that the monetary policy, by its implementation of the Program, 
has ceased to be as accommodating, as it used to be in the 
hyperinflation conditions, without becoming really restrictive. Quite 
opposite,  after  the  October  "coup",  using  effecting  of until  then 
un-operative dis-balance between the quantity of domestic money at 
hand and foreign exchange reserves, with which the direct connection 
between the growth of money and domestic prices has been interrupted 
(at least temporarily), the continuation of relatively high increase of 
money mass has made a fast re-monetisation of the national economy 
possible. 
 
Thus, in the last 12 months, the money supply has increased by 190%, 
and as the realised social product, approximated by the net payment of 
the realised products and services, has increased by 44%, the quantity 
of the real money measured by the relation between nominal level of 
the money supply and monthly value of the realised social product has 
augmented from the October last year 0.725 to 1.461 in October this 
year, which implies the slowing of the velocity of money from 16.55 to 
8.21 a year. The figures correspond approximately to the relations 
existing in 1992, before entering the cycle of hyper-inflation which has 
drastically reduced the real quantity of domestic money, excluding it not 
only as the measure of value and calculation unit, but also largely as 
payment choice, and particularly as savings choice. 
 
The reflection of the fact can be detected in the increase of primary 
liquidity of the bank from 1.7 to 2.7%, there is also the stabilisation of 
the relation  on  the money market, where the demand has been 
globally harmonized  with  supply  and  has  become  6 times lower than 
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in the first months of the stabilisation program implementation, 
remaining on the level of 6% of the money supply compared to the 
previous 65%. 
 
The basis of the remonetization has been represented by the conversion 
of a part of the foreign exchange reserves, which have reached 
US$2,300 million at the end of October in 1994, showing almost 
US$1,100 million increase in comparison to October 1993. Within the 
figure, the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank have increased 
from US$500 to US$1,370 million (thus increasing their part in the 
structure of total reserves from 40 to about 60%), determining the 
increase of the monetary base in the countervalue of US$530 million. At 
variations of the share of monetary base in the money supply around 
55% average, it has resulted in the increase of about US$1,000 million 
or by 162%. That way the combination of the monetary multiplicator 
and initial appreciation of the exchange rate has lead, during the 
present implementation of the stabilisation program, to the increase of 
the relation of the money supply and foreign exchange reserves of the 
central bank from 0.76 to 1,0 as well as of the relation of the money 
supply to the total foreign exchange reserves from 0.30 to 0.59, which 
represents the foreign exchange aspect of the remonetisation. 
 
As such has been the basis, the remonetisation could have had the 
intensity and extension to neutralise the structural problems in 
allocating the money means, which always implies the existence of 
significant differences in the distribution of the liquidity. Owing to the 
fact the price of money remains very high despite the lowering of the 
discount rate of the central bank from 34.5% at the end of 1993 to the 
present day 8.5% a year. Thus the average year interest rate of the 
business banks for the short-term non-marked credit-loans mounts to 
17%, the same as the level of the interest rates on the money market, 
while the interest rate for the investment credit-loans exceeds 20% 
which is objectively much higher than tie potential gross profit rates. It 
is, however, the problem the monetary policy cannot solve by itself. 
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However, despite the high price of money, the remonetisation of the 
national economy in the condition of stable prices of commodities and 
services on the domestic market, has made the fast real increase of the 
incomes and domestic aggregate demand possible. Thus, the mass of 
net wages has increased by 38% from October last till October this 
year, and the fact has not been forced by social reasons, but has been 
the logical economical result of the positive influence of stopping of 
inflation and performed remonetisation on the real growth of net 
revenues of enterprises. 
 
The share of the net wages in the revenue has decreased with the 
previous indexation of over-dimensional 28% in October and 31 % in 
November and December of the last year to 22% in September and 
October this year, while the whole period January-October 1994 the 
average has been 27%. The fact that in the same period of last year the 
share had been lower (24%) only points to the fact that the 
mechanisms of the inflation taxation of the months preceding the 
bringing of the Stabilisation program have decreased the production 
potentials of the economy. 
 
During summer months, for the first time since 1991, such moves of the 
basic component in the forming of the paymentable demand of the 
population on the domestic market have been connected to a significant 
increase of tourism, so that the consumer's expenditure for commodities 
and services have been continually increasing, reaching, in October 
1994, the 69% higher level than the preceding year one, and being by 
30% higher for the January to October period than in 1993. 
 
This rises the tax basis and, with the effects of introduction of excise 
duties, reduction of the tax evasion and the occurrence of Tanzi-Oliver 
effect, it is corresponding to the gross collection of budget revenues 
increase of 50%, its level being 33% really higher than in 1993. 
 
Primary effect of such movements of incomes is the occurrence of the 
surplus  in  the budget (4%  of total revenues), making the reduction of 
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net liabilities with the central bank and the increase of liquidity possible. 
The fact brings the increase of material expenditure of the public sector 
- either current or based on the earlier established liabilities towards the 
economy. The expenditure has risen in the last 12 months by 43% and 
thus the level has really increased by 22% in comparison to 1993 
figures. 
 
The tendency of acceleration is pointing to the third component of the 
domestic aggregate demand - payment for investment, rather low level 
and high monthly oscillations are still not pointing to the conclusion that 
there have been some significant moves in that sector. This 
differentiates the structure but does not reduce the total dynamics of 
the growth of the domestic aggregate demand, the level of which has 
increased from October last year to October this year by 59%. This 
situation has been analogous to the situation in the sphere of money 
means, where, naturally, there also exist problems of structural 
character, particularly in non-essential consumer commodities and 
investment equipment area, but globally it is shown that stopping of the 
inflation accompanied with the remonetisation of the national economy 
has not brought, contrary to expectations, the contraction of the 
domestic market. 
 
On the other side, however, the influence of the appreciation of the 
foreign exchange rate, as well as the increase of the domestic demand 
for commodities from more substitutive markets, upon the movement of 
exports appear more problematic and consequently, they are the 
subject of far more pronounced differences of viewing the problems, as 
the question of exports is regarded within the really increased prices of 
work and capital on the domestic market. Connected to the afore said is 
the fact that the exportation of commodities has been on a very low 
level at the beginning of 1994, though due to longer cycles of 
contracting of business and delivery of goods one should be very careful 




lt is the matter of too great a drop to be explained only on the basis of 
one factor, particularly not the movement of the exchange rate, or 
primarily as the consequence of the producers definite reluctance to 
make contracts and realise export trading in the conditions of the 
appreciation of the exchange rate at the beginning of the stabilisation 
program implementation which has preceded the reduction of the prices 
on the domestic market, either due to relative drop of the rentability of 
the exports and to the distrusting of the Program and expectations that 
the monetary reform (performed at the end of May) will be 
accompanied by the devaluation. But the increase of exportation 
occurring in the middle of 1994 points to the fact that this element can 
offer explanation on only one, more speculative, aspect of the 
movements of exportation following the implementation of the Program, 
from the point of view of real determinants and the totality of motifs. 
 
At least two relevant factors should be added. The first is referring to 
the change of external conditions of decision making and the realisation 
of export business connected to the adequate changes of political 
circumstances in the expanses. Significantly low level of exports, but the 
imports as well, i.e. total foreign trade with all the important partners at 
the beginning of the year, followed by the general continuity of the 
increase of the trade business are indicators for the above. The other 
factor arises from the cumulated effects of the remonetisation of the 
economy with simultaneous relatively high foreign exchange liquidity of 
the business banks, which allows two groups of factors. 
 
On one side, the passability of the channel is being increased in the 
sphere of financing the production and the preparations for exports 
particularly regarding internal and external components, the reflection of 
which  is  the  powerful  boost  of  importation of production materials 
in  the last months. On the other side, the same combination of 
elements has made the significant increase of importation of consumer 
goods possible, intensifying the competition on the domestic market 
regarding   the   quantities   as   well   as   the   prices.  Thus,  with  the 
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stabilisation of the exchange rate and domestic prices, the manoeuvring 
space for the autonomous selection of partially substitutive markets for 
product placement has been reduced. 
 
If the above is connected to the movement of the domestic demand, 
the answer is reached regarding the expenditure of the Stabilisation 
program implementation. 
 
If the stopping of the inflation has made the real increase of incomes 
and demand on the domestic market possible, and the way in which it 
was done has not resulted autonomously in significantly worsening of 
the exports problems, then the macro-economic expenses of the 
Program implementation in the past period must have been small. 
Particularly in the fact that the resultant of the movement of the total 
demand has begun the formation of the basis for the industrial 
production growth. While, the initial post-inflatory growth of domestic 
aggregate demand, at the beginning of the year, in the conditions of 
low exports, caused first the drop of stocks of finished products, 
particularly of consumer goods which, from October last year to April 
this year, have been reduced at the average monthly deseasoned rate 
of 3.5%, inducing the drop of total stocks at the rate of 2%, the 
simultaneous increase of exports and domestic demand is beginning, 
accompanied now with the stagnation of stocks accumulation, to reflect 
on the movement of the production. Due to the problems in the sector 
of equipment and, in general, investments, the growth does not appear 
to be particularly intensive nor time nor structurally balanced, but the 
deseasoned level of industrial production in October this year is 6% 
bigger than the February minimum (when the problems of exports have 
been more striking), reaching again the level of October last year. 
 
On the other hand, there is also the tendency of balancing the trade, 
and with the significantly increased exports of services it is resulting in 







However, it does not mean that further unchanged form of the 
implementation of the anti-inflation could keep the stability of the prices 
on a more permanent basis. In fact, the experience shows that anti-
inflation programs are not "constant consumer goods", they are quickly 
being exhausted, and the effects realised by them are frequently 
changing the total economic situation in a way that the further 
implementation of unchanged scenario might quickly become counter-
productive with regard to the goals. And that is exactly the case in 
Croatia. 
 
The basic results of the present implementation of the Program: it was 
possible to achieve the stopping of the inflation with simultaneous 
remonetisation, with only the constellation of relations among crucial 
economic variables that existed on the crest of inflation wave, and with 
the influence of the Program implementation the constellation has 
begun to be slowly changing in its "natural" direction of mutual long-
term inconsistency of high increase of money supply, stability of the 
exchange rate on the foreign exchange market and stability of prices. 
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It appears logical that in the limits of the stand-by arrangement the 
International Monetary Fund has insisted on firm limiting of the net 
domestic assets of the banking system with simultaneous de-limitation 
of the interest rates - which in fact represents the return to the original 
concept of the Program, which has been abandoned in the process of its 
passing and the current practical implementation as it has been 
considered over-restrictive. 
 
Though the return has been relativised by the fact that it is to be 
reached at a much higher level of real money from the one existing at 
the time of passing the Program, by which the implications have been 
significantly softened, it represents one of the key components to 
induce the maturing of the present mainly anti-inflation policy into the 
more complex stabilisation policy. While the stopping of the hyper-
inflation, performed in the conditions of simultaneous remonetisation, 
still has not lead to more important changes in the structure of the 
economy, the direct monetary limitations (connected to the reduced 
possibility of para-fiscal re-distribution of the means by the monetisation 
of the deficit) will inevitably lead to a certain re-allocation of money 
means among the economic subjects, and this will strengthen the 
mutual differentiating and gradual establishing of new economic 
structure able to function in the conditions of low inflation. 
 
Further maintaining of the stability of prices and strengthening of the 
financial discipline are necessary assumptions not to make the 
differentiation developmentally counterproductive, i.e. that it may be in 
the function of increasing the global efficacity, which again requires the 
successful balancing between two opposite tendencies which are 
accompanying  autonomously the limiting of money supply, if it is 
under-balanced, and these are forms of the pressure for increasing the 
already high interest rates and the appreciation of the exchange rate on 
the foreign exchange market. Whether it is possible to achieve the 
situation is essentially depending on the initial quantity of the real 
money, i.e. on the question if its very limited increase in the following 
period  be  sufficient  to make,  in  the conditions of relatively decreased 
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mobility, the appreciation not to reach the level which would induce 
greater disturbances in balance of payments and production, without it 
simultaneously leading to the inflation of the demand while not, at 
firmly limited increase of net domestic assets, reducing the monetary 
multiplicator so much that it may induce thus also the drop of 
production through interests and the level of credits to economy. 
 
It is difficult to give the reply to the question, in the sense of precise 
and empirical defining of "optimal" quantity of money in the present 
moment of Croatian economy, though the velocity of money had 
significantly approached the average values of the pre-war period, and 
the interruption of the de-Elation tendency can also be explained as the 
indicator pointing to the fact that the remonetisation has approached 
the level above which it is inducing a short-term inflation as, contrary to 
that, the high interest rates are also pointing that the great problems in 
the allocating of money, i.e. in the structure of the bank assets, just as 
the pressure for the appreciation of the exchange currency are showing 
to a still relative lack of demand for foreign exchange with regard to the 
need for the domestic currency or, said otherwise, to limited possibilities 
of the absorption of accumulated foreign exchange reserves into 
domestic money flows at the existing level of economic activities and 
prices. 
 
In connection with it, it appears important to state that, according to 
the regulations of stand-by arrangement, the quantity, structure and 
sector distribution of money will be regulated through 4 nominal 
anchors, the first two being relevant for global supply, and the 
remaining two for the structure of demand. The first group includes the 
top level limiting of the increase of net domestic assets of the banking 
system and determining of the bottom level limit of the increase of net 
foreign assets of the central bank. As the two components total is 
dominantly determining the change of total liquid means in the national 
economy, they are determining the potential of total money supply, but 
only in the way which would be leaving the structure flexible. 
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That is occurring because the primary emission is not formally limited by 
which the central bank is keeping a relatively significant space for 
interventions on the foreign exchange market. However, if, in some 
operations, the central bank was to be emitting the ready money faster 
than the allowed increase of the net domestic assets, the space of 
autonomous creation of deposit money by the business banks, i.e. the 
monetary multiplicator would be reduced. Thus, in such conditions, to 
enable the banks to satisfy the demand for credit-loans from the 
economy subjects it appears necessary to be consistently realising 
another group of anchors which would be limiting the increase of 
crediting the state and selected enterprises in which the state is major 
owner, in order to reduce their share in the use of credit-loans. 
 
It is the matter of a simple principle of joined containers by which the 
stability of prices is to be attempted as well as the normal financing of 
"healthy" part of economy made possible. The success needs all the 
parts of the mechanism to function harmonically. In case of success 
there is no more great danger from sudden drastic changes of exchange 
rates and interest rats which would be sure to arise from the reduction 
general liquidity. 
 
It seems logical to conclude that the whole situation carries, in itself, 
certain risks, but these are directly arising from basic principles of the 
Stabilisation program the further realisation of which, after the first 
successful, anti-inflatory, phase requires adequate moves in the policy 
of economy. 
 
